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Verifiable blind quantum computing is a secure delegated quantum computing where a client with
a limited quantum technology delegates her quantum computing to a server who has a universal
quantum computer. The client’s privacy is protected (blindness) and the correctness of the compu-
tation is verifiable by the client in spite of her limited quantum technology (verifiability). There are
mainly two types of protocols for verifiable blind quantum computing: the protocol where the client
has only to generate single-qubit states, and the protocol where the client needs only the ability
of single-qubit measurements. The latter is called the measurement-only verifiable blind quantum
computing. If the input of the client’s quantum computing is a quantum state whose classical ef-
ficient description is not known to the client, there was no way for the measurement-only client to
verify the correctness of the input. Here we introduce a new protocol of measurement-only verifiable
blind quantum computing where the correctness of the quantum input is also verifiable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blind quantum computing is a secure delegated quan-
tum computing where a client (Alice) who does not have
enough quantum technology delegates her quantum com-
puting to a server (Bob) who has a universal quan-
tum computer without leaking any information about
her quantum computing. By using measurement-based
quantum computing [1, 2], Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and
Kashefi first showed that blind quantum computing is
indeed possible for a client who can do only the single
qubit state generation [3]. Since the breakthrough, many
theoretical improvements have been obtained [4–12], and
even a proof-of-principle experiment was achieved with
photonic qubits [13]. These blind quantum computing
protocols guarantee two properties: first, if Bob is hon-
est, Alice can obtain the correct result of her quantum
computing (correctness). Second, whatever Bob does,
he cannot gain any information about Alice’s quantum
computing (blindness) [14].
In stead of the single-qubit state generation, the ability
of single-qubit measurements is also enough for Alice: it
was shown in Ref. [15] that Alice who can do only single-
qubit measurements can perform blind quantum comput-
ing. The idea is that Bob generates a graph state and
sends each qubit one by one to Alice. If Bob is honest, he
generates the correct graph state and therefore Alice can
perform the correct measurement-based quantum com-
puting (correctness). If Bob is malicious, he might send
a wrong state to Alice, but whatever Bob sends to Alice,
Alice’s measurement angles, which contain information
about Alice’s computation, cannot be transmitted to Bob
due to the no-signaling principle (blindness). The proto-
col is called the measurement-only protocol, since Alice
needs only measurements.
A problem in all these protocols is the lack of the ver-
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ifiability: although the blindness guarantees that Bob
cannot learn Alice’s quantum computing, he can still
deviate from the correct procedure, mess up her quan-
tum computing, and give Alice a completely wrong re-
sult. Since Alice cannot perform quantum computing by
herself, she cannot check the correctness of the result by
herself unless the problem is, say, in NP, and therefore
she can accept a wrong result. To solve the problem, veri-
fiable blind quantum computing protocol was introduced
in Ref. [16], and some theoretical improvements were also
obtained [17–19]. Experimental demonstrations of the
verification were also done [20, 21]. The basic idea of
these protocols is so called the trap technique: Alice hides
some trap qubits in the register, and any change of a trap
signals Bob’s malicious behavior. By checking traps, Al-
ice can detect any Bob’s malicious behavior with high
probability. If the computation is encoded by a quantum
error detection code, the probability that Alice is fooled
by Bob can be exponentially small, since in that case in
order to change the logical state, Bob has to touch many
qubits, and it consequently increases the probability that
Bob touches some traps.
Recently, a new verification protocol that does not use
the trap technique was proposed [22] (see also Ref. [23]).
In this protocol, Bob generates a graph state, and sends
each qubit of it one by one to Alice. Alice directly veri-
fies the correctness of the graph state (and therefore the
correctness of the computation) sent from Bob by mea-
suring stabilizer operators. This verification technique is
called the stabilizer test. Note that the stabilizer test is
useful also in quantum interactive proof system [24–28].
Although computing itself is verifiable through the sta-
bilizer test, the input is not if it is a quantum state whose
classical efficient description is not known to Alice. For
example, let us assume that Alice receives a state |ψ〉
from Charlie, and she wants to apply a unitary U on |ψ〉.
If she delegates the quantum computation to Bob in the
measurement-only style, a possible procedure is as fol-
lows. Alice first sends |ψ〉 to Bob. Bob next entangles |ψ〉
to the graph state. Bob then sends each qubit of the state
2one by one to Alice, and Alice does measurement-based
quantum computing on it. If Bob is honest, Alice can
realize U |ψ〉. Furthermore, as is shown in Refs. [24], Al-
ice can verify the correctness of the graph state by using
the stabilizer test even if some states are coupled to the
graph state. However, in the procedure, the correctness
of the input state is not guaranteed, since Bob does not
necessarily couple |ψ〉 to the graph state, and Alice can-
not check the correctness of the input state. Bob might
discard |ψ〉 and entangles completely different state |ψ′〉
to the graph state. In this case what Alice obtains is
not U |ψ〉 but U |ψ′〉. Can Alice verify that Bob honestly
coupled her input state to the graph state?
In this paper, we introduce a new protocol of
measurement-only verifiable blind quantum computing
where not only the computation itself but also the quan-
tum input are verifiable. Our strategy is to combine the
trap technique and the stabilizer test. The correctness of
the computing is verified by the stabilizer test, and the
correctness of the quantum input is verified by checking
the trap qubits that are randomly hidden in the input
state. When the traps are checked, the state can be iso-
lated from the graph state by measuring the connecting
qubits in Z basis. The main technical challenge in our
proof is to show that the trap verification and the stabi-
lizer verification can coexist with each other.
II. STABILIZER TEST
We first review the stabilizer test. Let us consider an
N -qubit state ρ and a set g ≡ {g1, ..., gn} of generators of
a stabilizer group. The stabilizer test is a following test:
1. Randomly generate an n-bit string k ≡
(k1, ..., kn) ∈ {0, 1}n.
2. Measure the operator
sk ≡
n∏
j=1
g
kj
j .
Note that this measurement can be done with
single-qubit measurements, since sk is a tensor
product of Pauli operators.
3. If the result is +1 (−1), the test passes (fails).
The probability of passing the stabilizer test is
ppass =
1
2n
∑
k∈{0,1}n
Tr
(I + sk
2
ρ
)
.
We can show that if the probability of passing the test is
high, ppass ≥ 1−ǫ, then ρ is “close” to a certain stabilized
state σ in the sense of
Tr(Mσ)(1− 2ǫ)−
√
2ǫ ≤ Tr(Mρ) ≤ Tr(Mσ) +
√
2ǫ (1)
for any POVM element M .
In fact, if ppass ≥ 1− ǫ, we obtain
Tr
( k∏
j=1
I + gj
2
ρ
)
≥ 1− 2ǫ.
Let
Λ ≡
k∏
j=1
I + gj
2
.
From the gentle measurement lemma [29],
1
2
‖ρ− ΛρΛ‖1 ≤
√
1− Tr(Λρ)
≤
√
1− (1− 2ǫ)
=
√
2ǫ.
Note that
gj
ΛρΛ
Tr(Λρ)
gj =
ΛρΛ
Tr(Λρ)
for any j, and therefore, ΛρΛ/Tr(Λρ) is a stabilized state.
For any positive operator M ,
Tr(Mρ)− Tr(ΛρΛ) ≤
√
2ǫ,
which means
Tr(Mρ) ≤ Tr
(
M
ΛρΛ
Tr(Λρ)
)
Tr(Λρ) +
√
2ǫ
≤ Tr
(
M
ΛρΛ
Tr(Λρ)
)
+
√
2ǫ.
And, for any positive operator M ,
Tr(ΛρΛ)− Tr(Mρ) ≤
√
2ǫ,
which means
Tr(Mρ) ≥ Tr
(
M
ΛρΛ
Tr(Λρ)
)
Tr(Λρ)−
√
2ǫ
≥ Tr
(
M
ΛρΛ
Tr(Λρ)
)
(1− 2ǫ)−
√
2ǫ.
III. OUR PROTOCOL
Now we explain our protocol and analyze it, which is
the main result of the present paper. Let us consider
the following situation: Alice possesses an m-qubit state
|ψ〉, but she neither knows its classical description nor a
classical description of a quantum circuit that efficiently
generates the state. (For example, she just receives |ψ〉
from her friend Charlie, etc.) She wants to perform a
polynomial-size quantum computing U on the input |ψ〉,
but she cannot do it by herself. She therefore asks Bob,
who is very powerful but not trusted, to perform her
quantum computing. We show that Alice can delegate
3her quantum computing to Bob without revealing |ψ〉 and
U , and she can verify the correctness of the computation
and input.
For simplicity, we assume that Alice wants to solve a
decision problem L. Alice measures the output qubit of
U |ψ〉 in the computational basis, and accepts (rejects)
if the result is 1 (0). As usual, we assume that for any
yes instance x, i.e., x ∈ L, the acceptance probability is
larger than a, and for any no instance x, i.e., x /∈ L, the
acceptance probability is smaller than b, where a − b ≥
1/poly(|x|).
Our protocol runs as follows:
1. Alice randomly chooses a 3m-qubit permutation P ,
and applies it on
|Ψ〉 ≡ |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉⊗m ⊗ |+〉⊗m
to generate P |Ψ〉. Alice further chooses a random
6m-bit string (x1, ..., x3m, z1, ..., z3m) ∈ {0, 1}6m,
and applies
⊗3m
j=1X
xj
j Z
zj
j on P |Ψ〉 to generate
|Ψ′〉 ≡
( 3m⊗
j=1
X
xj
j Z
zj
j
)
P |Ψ〉.
She sends |Ψ′〉 to Bob. (Or, it is reasonable to as-
sume that Charlie gives Alice |Ψ′〉 and information
of P and (x1, ..., x3m, z1, ..., z3m) in stead of giving
|ψ〉.)
2. If Bob is honest, he generates the (3m+N)-qubit
state
|GΨ′〉 ≡
( ⊗
e∈Econnect
CZe
)
(|Ψ′〉 ⊗ |G〉), (2)
and sends each qubit of it one by one to Alice, where
CZe is the CZ gate on the vertices of the edge e, and
Econnect is the set of edges that connects qubits in
|G〉 and |Ψ′〉 (Fig. 1). If Bob is malicious, he sends
any (3m+N)-qubit state ρ to Alice.
3. 3-a. With probability q, which is specified later,
Alice does the measurement-based quantum
computing on qubits sent from Bob. If the
computation result is accept (reject), she ac-
cepts (rejects). (During the computation, Al-
ice of course corrects the initial random Pauli
operator and permutation (
⊗3m
j=1X
xj
j Z
zj
j )P .)
3-b. With probability (1−q)/2, Alice does the sta-
bilizer test, and if she passes (fails) the test,
she accepts (rejects).
3-c. With probability (1− q)/2, Alice does the fol-
lowing test, which we call the input-state test:
Let V1 and V2 be the set of qubits in the red
dotted box and the blue dotted box in Fig. 1,
respectively. Alice stores qubits in V2 in her
memory, and measures each qubit in V1 in Z
basis. If the Z-basis measurement result on
the nearest-neighbour of jth vertex in V2 is
1, Alice applies Z on the jth vertex in V2 for
j = 1, ..., 3m. If Bob was honest, the state of
V2 is now
|Ψ′〉 =
( 3m⊗
j=1
X
xj
j Z
zj
j
)
P |Ψ〉.
Alice further applies P †(
⊗3m
j=1X
xj
j Z
zj
j ) on V2.
If Bob was honest, the state of V2 is now
|Ψ〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉⊗m ⊗ |+〉⊗m. Then Alice
performs the projection measurement {Λ0 ≡
|0〉〈0|⊗m ⊗ |+〉〈+|⊗m,Λ1 = I⊗2m − Λ0}, on
the last 2m qubits of V2. If she gets Λ0, she
accepts. Otherwise, she rejects.
G
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FIG. 1: The state |GΨ′〉. The state in the red dotted box is
|G〉 and that in the blue dotted box is |Ψ′〉. Econnect is the
set of edges that connects qubits in the red dotted box and
those in the blue dotted box.
Now let us analyze the protocol. First, the blindness is
obvious, since what she sends to Bob is the completely-
mixed state from Bob’s view point, and due to the no-
signaling principle, Alice’s operations on states sent from
Bob do not transmit any information to Bob.
Second, let us consider the case of x ∈ L. In this
case, honest Bob generates the correct state, |GΨ′〉,
Eq. (2), and therefore Alice can do correct computation,
if she chooses the measurement-based quantum comput-
ing, passes the stabilizer test with probability 1, if she
chooses the stabilizer test, and passes the input-state test
with probability 1, if she chooses the input-state test.
Therefore, the acceptance probability, px∈Lacc , is
px∈Lacc ≥ qa+
1− q
2
× 1 + 1− q
2
× 1
= qa+ (1− q) ≡ α.
Finally, let us consider the case of x /∈ L. In this case,
Bob might be malicious, and can send any (3m + N)-
qubit state ρ. Let pGpass and pψpass be the probability
of passing the stabilizer test and the initial-state test,
respectively.
Let ǫ = 1poly(|x|) . It is easy to see that the acceptance
probability, px/∈Lacc , is given as follows:
1. If pGpass ≥ 1− ǫ and pψpass < 1− ǫ, then
px/∈Lacc < q +
1− q
2
+
1− q
2
(1− ǫ) ≡ β1.
42. If pGpass < 1− ǫ and pψpass ≥ 1− ǫ, then
px/∈Lacc < q +
1− q
2
(1− ǫ) + 1− q
2
= β1.
3. If pGpass < 1− ǫ and pψpass < 1− ǫ, then
px/∈Lacc < q +
1− q
2
(1− ǫ) + 1− q
2
(1− ǫ)
= q + (1− q)(1 − ǫ) ≡ β2.
Let us consider the remaining case, pGpass ≥ 1− ǫ and
pψpass ≥ 1 − ǫ. From the triangle inequality and the
invariance of the trace norm under a unitary operation,
we obtain
1
2
∥∥ρ−GΨ′∥∥1 = 12
∥∥ρ−Gσ +Gσ −GΨ′∥∥1
≤ 1
2
∥∥ρ−Gσ∥∥1 + 12
∥∥Gσ −GΨ′∥∥1
=
1
2
∥∥ρ−Gσ∥∥1 + 12
∥∥σ − |Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|∥∥
1
,
where GΨ′ ≡ |GΨ′〉〈GΨ′ |,
Gσ ≡
( ⊗
e∈Econnect
CZe
)
(σ ⊗ |G〉〈G|)( ⊗
e∈Econnect
CZe
)
,
and σ is any 3m-qubit state on V2. Since pGpass ≥ 1− ǫ,
the first term is upperbounded as
1
2
∥∥ρ−Gσ∥∥1 ≤
√
2ǫ,
from Eq. (1). We can show that if pψpass ≥ 1 − ǫ, the
second term is upperbounded as
1
2
∥∥σ − |Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|∥∥
1
≤
√
2ǫ+
√
2
3
+ ǫ. (3)
The proof is given in Appendix.
Therefore, we obtain
1
2
∥∥ρ−GΨ′∥∥1 ≤ 2
√
2ǫ+
√
2
3
+ ǫ
≡ δ,
which means
∣∣Tr(Πρ) − Tr(ΠGΨ′ )∣∣ ≤ δ
for the POVM element Π corresponding to the accep-
tance of the measurement-based quantum computing.
Therefore, the total acceptance probability, px/∈Lacc , is
px/∈Lacc ≤ q(b+ δ) +
1− q
2
+
1− q
2
= q(b+ δ) + (1− q) ≡ β3.
Let us define
∆1(q) ≡ α− β1 = q(a− 1) + ǫ(1− q)
2
,
∆2(q) ≡ α− β2 = q(a− 1) + ǫ(1− q),
∆3(q) ≡ α− β3 = q(a− b− δ).
The optimal value
q∗ ≡
ǫ
2
1 + ǫ2 − b− δ
of q is that satisfies ∆1(q) = ∆3(q). Then, if we take
a = 1− 2−r and b = 2−r for a polynomial r,
∆3(q
∗) =
ǫ
2 (a− b− δ)
1 + ǫ2 − b− δ
≥ ǫ
4
(
1− 2−r+1 − 2
√
2ǫ−
√
2
3
+ ǫ
)
≥ 1
poly(|x|) .
As usual, the inverse polynomial gap can be amplified
with a polynomial overhead.
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Appendix: Proof of Eq. (3)
In this appendix, we show Eq. (3). Due to the triangle inequality and the invariance of the trace norm under a
unitary operation,
1
2
∥∥σ − |Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|∥∥
1
=
1
2
∥∥∥σ − (
3m⊗
j=1
X
xj
j Z
zj
j
)
P
(
ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m)P †(
3m⊗
j=1
X
xj
j Z
zj
j
)∥∥∥
1
=
1
2
∥∥∥P †(
3m⊗
j=1
X
xj
j Z
zj
j
)
σ
( 3m⊗
j=1
X
xj
j Z
zj
j
)
P − ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m
∥∥∥
1
≤ 1
2
∥∥∥P †(
3m⊗
j=1
X
xj
j Z
zj
j
)
σ
( 3m⊗
j=1
X
xj
j Z
zj
j
)
P − ρbefore
∥∥∥
1
+
1
2
∥∥∥ρbefore − ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m
∥∥∥
1
,
where ρbefore is the state before measuring {Λ0,Λ1}.
From the monotonicity of the trace distance under a CPTP map, the first term is upperbounded as
1
2
∥∥∥P †(
3m⊗
j=1
X
xj
j Z
zj
j
)
σ
( 3m⊗
j=1
X
xj
j Z
zj
j
)
P − ρbefore
∥∥∥
1
≤ 1
2
‖Gσ − ρ‖1 ≤
√
2ǫ.
As is shown below, the second term is upperbounded as
1
2
∥∥∥ ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m − ρbefore
∥∥∥
1
≤
√
2
3
+ ǫ. (A.1)
6Therefore, we have shown Eq. (3).
Let us show Eq. (A.1). Note that
ρbefore =
1
(3m)!
1
43m
∑
P,α,k
P †σαEkσαP
(
ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m)P †σαE†kσαP,
where σα is a 3m-qubit Pauli operator, and Ek is a Kraus operator. Let us decompose each Kraus operator in terms
of Pauli operators as Ek =
∑
β C
k
βσβ . Since
I =
∑
k
E†kEk
=
∑
k,β,γ
Ck∗β C
k
γσβσγ
=
∑
k,β
|Ckβ |2I +
∑
k,β 6=γ
Ck∗β C
k
γσβσγ ,
we obtain
∑
k,β
|Ckβ |2 = 1.
Then,
ρbefore =
1
(3m)!
1
43m
∑
P,α,k,β,γ
CkβC
k∗
γ P
†σασβσαP
(
ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m)P †σασγσαP
=
1
(3m)!
∑
P,k,β
|Ckβ |2P †σβP
(
ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m)P †σβP
=
1
(3m)!
∑
P,β
DβP
†σβP
(
ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m)P †σβP
= D0
(
ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m)+ 1
(3m)!
∑
P,β 6=0
DβP
†σβP
(
ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m)P †σβP
≡ ρ1 + ρ2.
Here, σ0 = I
⊗3m, we have used the relation
∑
α
σασβσαρσασγσα = 0
for any ρ and β 6= γ, and defined
∑
k
|Ckβ |2 = Dβ.
Note that
∑
β
Dβ =
∑
β,k
|Ckβ |2 = 1.
It is obvious that
Tr
[(
I⊗m − ψ )⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m × ρ1
]
= 0.
7Furthermore,
Tr
[(
I⊗m − ψ )⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m × ρ2
]
=
1
(3m)!
∑
P,β 6=0
DβTr
[(
I⊗m − ψ )⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m × P †σβP ( ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m)P †σβP
]
≤ 1
(3m)!
∑
β 6=0
Dβ(2m× (3m− 1)!)
≤ 2m× (3m− 1)!
(3m)!
=
2
3
.
Therefore,
Tr
[(
I⊗m − ψ )⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m × ρbefore
]
≤ 2
3
,
which means
Tr
[
ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m × ρbefore
]
≥ Tr
[
I⊗m ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m × ρbefore
]
− 2
3
≥ 1− ǫ − 2
3
=
1
3
− ǫ,
where we have used the assumption that
pψpass = Tr
[
I⊗m ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m × ρbefore
]
≥ 1− ǫ.
Therefore
1
2
∥∥∥ ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m − ρbefore
∥∥∥
1
≤
√
1−
(1
3
− ǫ
)
=
√
2
3
+ ǫ.
